Introduction
There is now a general consensus holding that variation in institutional quality is the major source of cross-country differences in development patterns. According to this argument, high-quality institutions -in the form of non-corrupt and predictable government -are of crucial importance in promoting economic, political, as well as social development, while low-quality institutions ridden with corruption are likely to lead to less beneficial development outcomes. First, in terms of economic development, high-quality institutions are generally argued to lower uncertainty and, consequently, stimulate economic investment and growth, while -on the contrary -bad institutions in the form of kleptocratic rule, an insecure investment climate, and untrustworthy and unpredictable political systems are argued to hamper economic development (Rodrik et al. 2004; Bates 2006; Acemoglu et al. 2001 Acemoglu et al. , 2002 Knack and Keefer 1995; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Goldsmith 2004; Barzel 2002; Easterly 2002; Hall and Jones 1999; and Evans 1989) . Secondly, in terms of political development, lowquality institutions are argued to undermine the workings of democracy, especially in regard to rule of law, the equality of citizens before the law, the openness of decision making, accountability, political competition, and regime legitimacy (Karklins 2005; and Johnston 2005) . Finally, in terms of social development, corruption is argued to distort the functioning of the public sector, in the end leading to inefficiency and sub-optimal provision of public services such as healthcare and education (Gupta et al. 2001 ).
Yet, despite the importance of high-quality institutions for successful development outcomes, there is great variation in levels of institutional quality across countries. In other words, while the leaders of some countries promote the development of good government, others do not.
The aim of this paper is to contribute to an increased understanding of why this is the case. In particular, we argue that the variation in institutional quality we see today can partly be understood as a consequence of whether leaders were subject to threats -in the form of coups and conflictsduring formative periods of state development. As such, we acknowledge the mechanisms offered by established and generally accepted theories emphasizing the important role played by discount rates in informing leaders' choice of development paths -as well as theories about how threats directed towards leaders influence such discount rates -but add a historical institutional perspective to this literature, further increasing our understanding of why institutional quality varies across countries.
We test our theory on the case of Africa, arguing that in this context threats towards leaders during the formative period comprising the first generation of independent rule created a path dependency that is reflected in institutional quality even today.
In the remainder of this paper, we develop our argument further. As such, in the next section we take a closer look at the relationship between institutional quality and development more in detail. We then explore the rationale of leaders and the role of threats in determining the actions of leaders. Next, acknowledging the explanatory limits of the current literature focusing on the role played by contemporary threats in the process of development, we turn to historical institutional theory according to which events taking place during formative moments of state development are key to understanding variation in development patterns today. In order to test our argument, holding that institutional quality today is partly the result of the threats faced by leaders during formative periods of state development, we conduct an empirical analysis of the relationship between coups and conflicts during the first generation of independent rule in Africa (i.e. the first fifteen years following independence in each country) and the degree of institutional quality today. Performing a cross-country, quantitative analysis we find a significant and strong relationship between the two variables in focus. In the last section, we summarize our findings, as well as provide some conclusions.
Institutions and development
A large number of empirical studies now confirm that corrupt institutions, via the signals they send and incentives they infer, can ripple through an entire economy or political system (Johnston 2005) .
In terms of the impact on economic development, already Adam Smith (1776) was aware of the negative effects of corrupt institutions:
Commerce and manufactures can seldom flourish long in any state which does not enjoy a regular administration of justice, in which the people do not feel themselves secure in the possession of their property, in which the faith of contracts is not supported by law, and in which the authority of the state is not supposed to be regularly employed by enforcing the payment of debts from all those who are able to pay. Commerce and manufactures, in short, can seldom flourish in any state in which there is not a certain degree of confidence in the justice of government.
In fact, there is now a general consensus holding that variation in institutional quality is the major source of cross-country differences in economic growth and prosperity (Bates 2006; Acemoglu et al. 2001 Acemoglu et al. , 2002 and Knack and Keefer 1995) . Especially in poverty-stricken developing countries, highquality institutions have been argued to be necessary in order to create economic efficiency and growth. Asked to review the lessons of the World Bank policies for alleviating poverty, Lawrence Summers -former Chief Economist of the World Bank -for example argues that "an overwhelming lesson that I think we have learned in the 1990s is… the transcendent importance of the quality of institutions and the closely related questions of the efficacy of political administration" (cited in Besley and Ghatak 2007, 571) . In the same vein, it has been argued that the miraculous economic growth in Western Europe that started in the late 17th century can be explained by the presence of high quality institutions which reduce uncertainty and lower transaction costs (North 1990) . In line with this perspective, differing development trajectories thus "… [have] little to do with natural resource availability, climate, foreign aid, or luck. [Rather, they are] a function of whether incentives within a given society steer wealth-maximizing individuals toward producing new wealth or toward diverting it from others" (Knack 2003, 1) . Figure 1 supports such a claim, revealing a strong and positive correlation between institutional quality -as measured by World Bank's Control of Corruption Index (CCI) -and economic development (the correlation coefficient is 0.86). In fact, the ten least corrupt countries in the sample are on average twelve times as rich as the ten most corrupt countries, revealing a detrimental effect of corruption on development. The mechanisms that explain the negative relationship between corrupt institutions and economic development are many and varying. While some of the damage caused by extensive corruption is clear and direct, other effects are intangible, collective and long-term in nature (Johnston 2005) . For example, bribes that win public contracts for incompetent bidders reward inefficiency and may discourage efficient firms from entering a country's economy. Similarly, speed money paid to bureaucrats does not seem to break down administrative bottlenecks, but instead tells other officials that they too can make money by dragging their feet. Moreover, corruption distorts development priorities and leads to massive human and financial capital flight as political figures and their business cronies divert aid to offshore bank accounts. (Johnston 2005; Ades and di Tella 1994; Mauro 1995 Mauro , 1998 Robinson 1998; Gould and Amaro-Keyes 1983; and Rose-Ackerman 1978) .
In addition to its negative effects on the economy, corruption has an adverse impact on political and social development. Where corrupt connections guide decision making and political and bureaucratic discretion is put up for rent due process, democratic values and participation become irrelevant and opportunities are denied to many that need them most (Johnston 2005) . Corruption as such undermines the workings of democracy, especially in regard to rule of law, the equality of citizens before the law, the openness of decision making, accountability, political competition, and regime legitimacy (Karklins 2005) . Empirical studies in addition reveal that corruption is a major factor in the alleged widespread cynicism about politics and withdrawal from the public sphere (Rothschild and Chazan 1988) . In the words of Larry Diamond (2007): There is a specter haunting democracy in the world today. It is bad governance -governance that serves only the interests of a narrow ruling elite. Governance that is drenched in corruption, patronage, favoritism, and abuse of power.
In fact, similarly to what many scholars have argued, figure 2 reveals a strong relationship between institutional quality and political development (the correlation coefficient is 0.6631). In terms of the negative effects of corruption on social development, according to empirical studies countries with high levels of corruption are often plagued by inefficient government services.
In fact, according to estimates, child mortality rates in countries with high levels of corruption are about one-third higher than in countries with low levels of corruption; infant mortality rates and the share of low birth weight babies are almost twice as high; and student drop-out rates are five times as high (Gupta et al. 2001 ).
In sum, given the positive relationship between the existence of high-quality institutions and development outcomes, there is an urgent need for an increased understanding of why the leaders of some states choose or end up with institutions that are good for economic development while others do not. In an attempt to provide an answer to this question, in the next section we turn to the insights of previous studies on this issue.
Leaders, discount rates, and institutional development
Referring to the powerful position of leaders, there is now a general consensus holding that any theory of the state must ultimately include the role played by the ruling elite (Goldsmith 2001; Jones and Olken 2005; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Williams and Doig 2004; Riley 1998; Klitgaard 1998; Riley 1998; Doig and Riley 1998; Harsch 1993; and Theobald 1990) . According to this view, because of their powerful position, leaders are key to sustained institutional reform and, consequently, ultimately responsible for whether good or bad institutions are adopted. Hence, if our aim is to understand why some countries have better institutions than others, we should explore more in detail the underlying motivational factors that can explain why some leaders promote the development of high-quality institutions while others do not. In an attempt to do so, some researchers have attributed the adoption of high-quality institutions to the benevolence and far-sightedness of some leaders.
According to this argument, the reason why for example some sub-Saharan African countries find themselves among the most corrupt countries in the world, is simply that they have for some reason ended up with far too many "tropical gangsters" (Klitgaard 1990) . Similarly, the reason why some countries have prospered is that they are governed by leaders that are visionary and progressive by nature. That is, in line with this view, variation in institutional quality can ultimately be understood as a consequence of that some countries have been lucky enough to get "good" leaders, while others for some reason suffer under "bad" leadership. In this line of thought, a large number of scholars and policy makers have described some leaders -such as Isaias Afwerki in Eritrea, Meles Zenawi in Ethiopa, Olusegun Obasanjo in Nigeria, Mway Kibaki in Kenya, Yoweri Museveni in Uganda, and Paul Kagame in Rwanda -as "renaissance" leaders, while others -such as Idi Amin in Uganda, Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe, Mobutu Sese Seko in Zaire, and Jean-Bédel Bokassa in Central African Republic -have been described as inherently kleptocratic (Madavo and Sarbib 1997; Connell and Smyth 1998; and Sachs 2005) .
However, despite the -to many it seems -quite appealing argument that there exists such a thing as good and bad leaders per se, most researchers now challenge such a proposition. Instead, on theoretical and empirical grounds, there is now a growing consensus holding that leaders will adopt institutions that promote economic growth and aggregate welfare when the cost of not adopting such institutions is higher than the loss of income derived from establishing institutions that maximize aggregate welfare and not only the welfare of the political elite (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Acemoglu 2006; Goldsmith 2004; and Bates 2001) . In short, leaders will adopt high quality institutions only if they benefit from it. Departing from this proposition, if our aim is to understand variation in institutional quality, we should explore which factors impact on the costs and benefits related to the adoption of low-respectively high-quality institutions. Following this line of thought, many scholars hold that whether leaders are bad or good is ultimately determined by their time horizon and, consequently, their discount rate (Olson 1993 (Olson , 2000 Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; and Goldsmith 2001, 2004) . As such, the rationality of leaders should be understood as bounded. More specifically, according to these scholars, leaders with a long time horizon should be expected to have a low discount rate and, consequently, a predisposition for high-quality institutions, while leaders with a short time horizon should be expected to be strictly self-interested in the short run and, hence, kleptocratic. In particular, any rational leader with a long time horizon should be expected to act in line with a Coase Theorem type of logic, establishing institutions that stimulate citizens output which, in turn, serves to increase the elite's tax revenues. According to the same logic, they should avoid the adoption of institutions that perpetuate mass poverty and economic stagnation since this only makes governing more difficult and costly. On the contrary, any rational leader with a short time horizon should be expected to discount the future and hence devote all his or her effort towards selfenrichment (Olson 1993; Clague et al. 1996; Evans 1989; and Levi 1988) . This is because the predicament facing leaders is that the potential pay-offs to most economic reforms lie in the future, while, at the same time, they need to hold on to power now (Olson 1993; and Acemoglu and Robinson 2006) . Consequently, while it is true that high-quality institutions may fatten the cow the leader has the power to milk, if uncertain being the ones to reap the future benefits of institutional reform, leaders are not likely to alter the prevailing arrangement (Bardhan 2005). Moreover, leaders will be likely to be reluctant to institutional reform since, even though growth increases through the adoption of institutions that add predictability to human exchange, the welfare of leaders does not necessarily increase. Given a short time horizon and high discount rate of future utility, it is hence reasonable to believe that elites will typically choose to increase their income in the short term and directly or indirectly transfer resources from the rest of society to themselves (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Acemoglu 2006; Goldsmith 2004; Bates, Greif, and Singh 2002; and Bates 2001 ).
If we take our point of departure in the idea that leaders have bounded rationality and are ultimately guided by their time horizons and discount rates, if the aim is to understand variation in institutional quality we should take a closer look at the factors influencing the time horizons and discount rates of leaders. That is, the puzzle that needs to be explained is under what circumstances leaders have shorter respectively longer time horizons. While there are of course many factors potentially influencing leaders' discount rates -such as, for example, the amount of non-earned income available to leaders, and the degree of pressure exercized by the international community 1 -in the previous literature especially one explanation stands out as the most ambitious account of different institutional choices; the impact of threats.
Threats, leaders and discount rates
The argument holding that threats towards leaders have a negative effect on institutional quality particularly stresses that an insecure power base is unlikely to promote measured actions to obtain long-term returns (Goldsmith 2001; and Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Englebert 2000; and Migdal 1988, 2001 ). Instead, ruling elites facing threats to their rule should be expected to find it less costly and, hence, more convenient to resort to corruption, clientelism, nepotism, and other forms of bad governance (Englebert 2000; Sandbrook 1972; and Jackson and Rosberg 1984) . In line with this view, the appeal of kleptocratic rule is in other words argued to lie in its capacity to deliver immediate payoffs. More specifically, kleptocratic policies are hypothesized to favor current government consumption at the expense of investments in physical and human capital, which have few -if anyshort-term returns to the ruling elite in terms of power (Englebert 2000) . Migdal (1988) refers to such short-term actions on behalf of leaders as the "politics of survival". In sum, from this perspective, whether a leader acts for the short or the long term should ultimately be expected to be influenced by his sense of the level of threat to his career since there is no (credible) way of compensating ex post the political elites who lose their power (Acemoglu 2003; and Goldsmith 2001) . Rulers with little legitimacy and a fragile power base should, as such, be expected to bolster domestic support by directing public resources to private actors through unofficial channels and networks, allowing official development policies to languish. On the contrary, if not being challenged, rulers should be expected to divert resources in favor of more long-term development (Englebert 2000) . In fact, in a global sample, the correlation between contemporary threats (defined as the existence of either coups or conflicts between 2006 and 2008) towards leaders and the level of corruption is fairly strong (the correlation coefficient is 0.23). If focusing exclusively on sub-Saharan Africa -the region in focus of this study -the relationship is even stronger (the correlation coefficient is 0.30). Table 1 lists the five least and most corrupt countries in sub-Saharan Africa, revealing a fairly clear pattern between contemporary threats and the quality of government. As the table reveals, quite in line with the argument holding that contemporary threats towards leaders should be expected to lead to bad governance, none of the least corrupt countries in sub-Saharan Africa has experienced any threats towards leaders in the form of conflict or coups during the last three years. However, when it comes to explaining the status of the most corrupt countries in sub-Saharan Africa, the theory does not fare quite as well. More specifically, whilealong with the theory, two of the most corrupt sub-Saharan African countries have in fact witnessed contemporary threats towards leaders, the majority of the cases have still not experienced any such threats. In other words, there still seems to be room for complementary and/or alternative interpretations. Moreover, and perhaps even more importantly, both the countries having experienced threats in more recent times, experienced similar threats already during the first generation of independent rule. In fact, in sub-Saharan Africa as a whole, there seems to be a strong correlation between the existence of threats during the first generation of independent rule and the existence of contemporary threats (the correlation coefficient is 0.36). Combining these empirical facts with the theoretical insights offered by historical institutionalism, we argue that there is reason to believe that threats towards leaders during formative periods of state development in fact play a significant role in explaining variation in institutional quality even today. In the next section, we develop this argument in more detail.
The lingering effects of formative periods of state development
While the micro mechanisms offered in theories about the important role played by threats in explaining variation in institutional quality in many ways seem plausible, when faced with empirical reality this argument obviously runs into problems. In this section, we illustrate how historical institutionalism -with its focus on critical junctures and path dependency -can help us understand this and, as such, contribute to a stronger theory of the determinants of institutional quality.
The theory of historical institutionalism emphasizes critical junctures -understood as "[periods] of significant change, which [occur] in distinct ways in different countries…and which
[are] hypothesized to produce distinct legacies" (Collier and Collier 1991, 29) -and the lingering effects of events taking place during such periods. That is, historical institutionalism recognizes critical junctures as "windows of opportunity" for institutional change in the sense that, what takes place during such periods, will affect subsequent development for a long period of time. In fact, even events that were considered mistakes, or were only present for a very short time, might according to this perspective cast a long shadow on the future (Peters 1996; and Thelen and Steinmo 1992) . The reason for this is to be found in the logic of path dependence (Hall and Taylor 1996; Thelen and Steinmo 1992; and Mahoney 2000) . According to this logic, we should expect institutions -such as, for example, corrupt systems of rule -established as a result of certain events taking place during formative periods of state development to be sticky and, hence, difficult to change. This is because, once in place, institutional arrangements induce complementary organizational forms, which in turn may generate new complementary institutions (North 1990; Pierson 2000) . In particular, institutions are subject to path dependency in the sense that, once a country or region has started down a track, the costs of reversal are very high. Consequently, even if there will be other choice points, the entrenchments of certain institutional arrangements obstruct an easy reversal of the initial choice (Pierson 2000; and Levi 1997) . In particular, institutional paths are self-reinforcing in the sense that "…each individual, responding to the institutional elements implied by others' behavior and expected behavior, behaves in a manner that contributes to enabling, guiding, and motivating others to behave in the manner that led to the institutional elements that generated the individual's behavior to begin with" (Greif 2006) . Or, applying this logic to corrupt institutions, we should expect such institutions to be self-reinforcing in the sense that corrupt institutions induce corrupt behavior on part of individuals, which in turn reinforces the problem of corruption since -as long as most other individuals are corrupt, it makes no real sense to actively try to change the system (Persson, Rothstein, and Teorell 2010) . This logic was nicely captured by the Swedish Nobel laureate Gunnar
Myrdal already in 1968 in his important work about what he labelled the "soft state" problem in Asia.
According to Myrdal (1968: 409) , any self-interested actor would reason like this: "Well, if everybody seems corrupt, why shouldn't I be corrupt."
Building on the insights offered by historical institutionalism, to the extent that threats matters for institutional quality such as has been suggested in the previous literature, we should expect the threats taking place during critical junctures to have a more significant effect than the threats taking place under less revolutionary periods of state development. In the next section, we test this proposition empirically, arguing that the first generation of independent rule in sub-Saharan Africa was a critical juncture, and that the threats towards leaders during this period is what to a significant extent explain the variation in institutional quality we see today. That is, depending on whether leaders were subject to threats shortly after independence or not, we should expect leaders to have embarked on very different development paths. These diverging paths should, in turn, be expected to have been subject to feedback processes, ultimately producing even greater differences in institutional quality between countries today than shortly after independence.
Empirical analysis: The historical determinants of institutional quality
The main argument developed in this paper is that threats towards leaders during formative periods of state development to a significant extent can explain variation in institutional quality today. In this section, we test this argument in a comparative study of sub-Saharan African countries, arguing that the first generation of independent rule is the critical juncture during which subsequent paths of institutional development were initiated. More specifically, according to our argument, countries in which the leaders were subject to threats during the first generation of independent rule should be expected to have institutions of lower quality today than countries in which the leaders were not subject to any threats.
To test our proposition, we use data from several different sources. To capture the independent variable, i.e. threats towards leaders during the first generation of independent rule, a dummy variable has been constructed which takes the value 0 if the leaders did not face any threats in the form of conflicts or coups d'états (both successful and failed) within fifteen years after independence, and the value 1 if such threats were in fact present. Given the purpose of the study, the conflicts of concern here are only those which somehow involve government elites. More specifically, the conflicts in focus are those which are characterized by a contested incompatibility between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, and that results in at least 25 battle-related deaths. Successful coups, in turn, refer to events in which existing regimes are suddenly and illegally displaced during at least one week, while failed coups refer to coups which involve either displacements lasting less than seven days, attempted assassinations and arrests of some of the existing regime, or the mobilization of the military police or security forces with the explicit aim of government take-over. The reason for choosing a dummy variable -capturing only the existence or non-existence of any of the events described -instead of a more nuanced variable, capturing maybe also the number of coup d'états or the length of conflicts, is purely theoretical. Recalling the theoretical discussion from a previous section about how threats are argued to have a negative impact on leaders' discount rates and, hence, willingness to invest in high-quality institutions, this theory does not distinguish between actual and latent threats. Neither does it give us any reason to believe that a larger number of coup d'états, more successful coup d'états, or longer periods of conflicts should make leaders feel more threatened. Rather, the marginal effect of threats should, in line with the theory, be expected to be very quickly decreasing, the knowledge of being subject to a latent threat alone being enough of an incentive for leaders to embark on a more predatory path. On the basis of this discussion, the data on conflicts have been collected from UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset up for discussion, in order to more carefully test our theory, in addition to CPI we to some extent also use World Bank's Control of Corruption Index (CCI) from the same year. This measure runs from -2.5 to 2.5, higher scores indicating lower levels of corruption. The correlation between the two measurements is about 75 percent. In the next two sub-sections, we test our argument empirically. As such, in the first sub-section we explore the power of our explanation in a bi-variate analysis of the relationship between threats towards leaders during the first fifteen years of independent rule in subSaharan Africa and the quality of government. In order to be able to further assess the strength of our argument, in the second sub-section, we then control for a number of alternative explanations to cross-country variation in institutional quality.
Historical threats and institutional quality
Despite similar historical background, there is significant variation in institutional quality across subSaharan Africa. In fact, the least corrupt country in sub-Saharan Africa (i.e. Botswana) scores 6.4 on the CPI -a score in parity with many industrialized countries -while the most corrupt country (i.e.
Nigeria) scores only 1.6, well below the 3 point mark indicating rampant corruption. While acknowledging the underlying logic of the argument that threats are indeed important in influencing the choice between developmental and kleptocratic rule, we argue that there are theoretical reasons for believing that threats against leaders during formative periods of state development are even more important in terms of understanding variation in institutional quality today than are contemporary threats. As Table 2 demonstrates, it seems like threats taking place during formative periods of state development can in fact better account for the differences in institutional quality we see today than the existence of contemporary threats. Quite contrary to the experiences of, for example, Chad and Nigeria, none of the leaders of the five least corrupt countries in sub-Saharan Africa faced any threats towards their rule during the first generation of independent rule. Consequently, being more certain of being able to reap the rewards of long-term investments, they chose to divert their energy towards promoting development.
This pattern has then been reproduced over time. Despite dull prospects at the time of independence, Botswana, in particular, early on stood out as an example of a liberal democracy where the rule of law was held in respect and where the promotion of the citizen welfare was high on the political agenda. In the absence of any real challenges towards his rule, the first independent leaderSeretse Khama -avoided extravagant expenditure on prestige projects and instead chose to invest in infrastructure and education (Goldsmith 2004; Rotberg 2004; and Meredith 2006) . From early on, corruption hardly existed. The development path on which Seretse Khama embarked upon was reinforced by subsequent leaders, leaving Botswana where it is today (Rotberg 2004 (Rotberg 2004) . However, in line with the argument put forward in this paper, they did not. Rather, the lack of threats towards their rule made them find it more rational to embark upon development paths which have left the two countries where they are today, i.e. outstanding in the developing world in terms of both institutional quality and political and economic development.
In fact, similar stories as the ones of Chad, Nigeria, Botswana, and Mauritius can be told in many of the sub-Saharan African cases listed in Table 3 below, depending on whether they are listed in column one -which lists all countries that did experience threats during the first generation of independent rule -or in column two, which lists all the countries not experiencing any coups or conflicts during this time. The average level of corruption in the countries not experiencing any threats towards leaders during the first generation of independent rule listed in the above table is 3.75 out of 10 while the average level of corruption in the countries experiencing such threats towards leaders is 2.56, revealing a notably higher willingness among leaders not experiencing any threats towards their power during formative periods of state development to establish high-quality institutions than the leaders experiencing threats. When performing a t-test, this difference in institutional quality between the countries experiencing threats during formative periods of state development and the ones not experiencing any such threats is highly significant, the probability that there is no difference between the two groups being only 0.0003. Figure 3 graphically illustrates the differences in institutional quality between the countries having experienced threats within the first fifteen years after independence (taking the value of 1) and the countries having not experienced any such threats (taking the value of 0). The outlier in the figure is Seychelles, having a CPI score of 4.4 despite the fact that the ruling elite in fact faced significant challenges during the first generation of independent rule. Excluding this outlier, the correlation between the existence of threats during the first generation of independent rule and institutional quality is -0.5377, indicating a clear negative effect of historical threats on leaders' discount rate and, consequently, government performance today (if the Seychelles is not excluded, the correlation coefficient is -0.5036). Even if we deconstruct the main variable into a number of more nuanced variables the relationship holds, the correlation between CPI and any coup attempt (successful or failed) being -0.4315, the correlation between CPI and successful coups being -0.2298, the correlation between CPI and failed coups being -0.2279, the correlation between CPI and conflicts being -0.2779, and the correlation between CPI and total years of conflict within fifteen years of conflict being -0.2236. Importantly and interestingly, the breakdown of the variable into more nuanced variables in many ways confirms the theory that it is the knowledge of being threatened at all rather than the level of threats that ultimately explains leaders' institutional choices.
Moreover, especially the breakdown of the variable "coups" into two variables -successful and failed coups -demonstrates the path dependent effects of threats taking place during formative periods of state development. Independently of whether the coups succeeded or failed, the existence of threats seems to make leaders more predatory. In other words, the history in terms of coups plays an important role in informing also the preferences of new leaders.
Having established a strong and significant bi-variate relationship between the key variable in focus of this paper and contemporary levels of institutional quality, to further explore the validity of the main argument put forward in this paper, in the next section we test it in relation to a number of alternative explanations.
A multivariate analysis
To be able to assess the strength of our argument, in this section we control for a significant number of alternative explanations to cross-country variation in institutional quality. In particular, based on their frequency and popularity in the previous literature, we control for the potential explanatory power of contemporary threats towards leaders (CT), the degree of natural resources available to leaders (NRD), the amount of foreign aid (FA), the legal origin of the government system (LO), the degree of ethnic fractionalization (ELF) , and population size (POP). As previously argued, a large number of researchers argue that contemporary threats towards leaders negatively affect the likelihood that leaders adopt high-quality institutions. To be able to assess the significance of this argument, we use a dummy variable following the same logic as the variable used to measure the extent to which leaders were subject to any threats during the first generation of independent rule. As previously mentioned, the data on that if leaders do not depend upon their constituents for resources, they have few incentives to establish institutions that promote democratic and economic development (Ross 1999) . To be able to assess the strength of this argument, a dummy variable has been constructed which takes the value 1 if fuel and non-fuel minerals exports comprise five or more percent of a country's GDP. 2 The data is taken from the World Bank's World Development Indicators (2010). The argument that the amount of foreign aid available to leaders matters for their willingness to promote good government comes in two versions. The first version builds on the same idea as the argument holding that non-tax revenue coming from natural resources is likely to make leaders less inclined to support the establishment of high-quality institutions (Knack 2000; and Djankov et al. 2008) . The other version draws the opposite conclusion -being based on the idea that foreign aid comes with strings attached and can as such act as an external pressure, supposedly fostering good governance (Dunning 2004; and Bearce and Tirone 2010) . To capture the validity of this argument we use a variable measuring the amount of official development assistance as a percentage of GNI (World Bank 2010). Theories emphasizing legal origin as an important factor affecting institutional quality commonly holds that the British legal tradition of common law (which is predominant in the former British colonies) has an advantage over the French one of civil law (which is predominant in the former French, Belgian, and Portuguese colonies) when it comes to fostering institutional quality (Hayek 1960; Levine 2005; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 2008) . To test this proposition, we use a variable constructed by La Porta et al. (1999) . Ethnic fractionalization (ELF) is commonly argued to negatively affect a large number of development outcomes, including the quality of government (Easterly and Levine 1997) .
In order to explore the explanatory power of this variable we use the ELF index (Roeder 2001) . The ELF index reflects the probability that two randomly selected people from a given country will not belong to the same ethno-linguistic group. Finally, given the commonly put forward argument that smaller states for various reasons perform better than larger states, we control for population size (World Bank 2010). In Table 4 , the correlation between all the variables included in the study is revealed. As the above table reveals, the explanatory variable in focus of this study -i.e. historical threats -is in fact the one most strongly correlated with institutional quality. More specifically, the correlation coefficient between the existence of threats during formative periods of state development is -0.5606 with CPI and -0.3992 with CCI (this sample excludes not only Seychelles, but in addition Sao Tomé and Príncipe due to lack of data on ethnic fractionalization). Table 4 further reveals that there is little reason to suspect any serious problems with multicollinearity. The variable most highly correlated with the explanatory variable of most importance for this paper -i.e. historical threats -is legal origin, most likely revealing the fact that former British colonies (i.e. the ones with common law) have experienced less coups and conflicts after independence than, for example, former French colonies. Further, the correlation matrix not only reveals a strong relationship between historical threats and institutional quality today, but in addition a fairly strong relationship between the existence of threats during the first generation of independent rule and contemporary threats. That is, many of the states plagued with conflict today experienced conflicts already shortly after independence, revealing a negative path dependence of conflicts as well. Comment: *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
Model 1 includes potential alternative factors influencing institutional quality. As can be seen, the overall model is not significant and explains only about nine percent of the variation in institutional quality across sub-Saharan Africa. In addition, none of the independent variables have any significant effect on institutional quality. In Model 2, we test the explanatory power of the main variable in focus of this study -i.e. historical threats -only. As revealed in the table, this model is highly significant and explains over 27 percent of the variation in institutional quality across sub-Saharan Africa. The effect of threats during formative moments of state development on institutional quality is in addition strong and highly significant, countries having experienced threats during formative moments of state development having a CPI score today being 1.24 lower than the countries not having faced such threats. Model 3 introduces the theoretically most closely related variable -i.e. the existence of contemporary threats -to Model 2. The explanatory power of this model is also quite strong, the adjusted R² being 0.2873. However, while historical threats still have a significant and strong effect on institutional quality today -the countries having experienced such threats having a CPI score today being 1.09 lower than the countries not having experienced any such threats -the effect of contemporary threats is both insignificant and weak (-0.3882). Finally, in Model 6 all variables are included. The impact of historical threats in this model is still strong, and the only one being significant, the effect being well over one unit on the CPI scale. In total, the model explains over 27 percent of the variation in institutional quality.
As can be seen in Table 6 below, the results remain significant and strong even if we, instead of using CPI as the dependent variable, introduces the alternative measure of institutional quality in the form of CCI. Again, the only variable having a strong and significant effect is historical threats.
However, important to note is that when all variables are included, the overall explanatory power of this model is weaker than the model having CPI as the independent variable; 15 percent compared to 27 percent. Comment: *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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In sum, this section has demonstrated the general explanatory power of the argument put forward in this study, as applied to sub-Saharan Africa. The results reveal a strong, negative, and significant effect of the existence of threats towards leaders during the first generation of independent rule on institutional quality today. In the next section, we summarize the results, as well as discuss the implications.
Summary and conclusions
There is now a consensus holding that threats towards leaders to a significant extent can explain the choice of development policy and, hence, variation in institutional quality. In particular, researchers now seem to agree that the discount rate of leaders should be expected to vary fundamentally depending on whether leaders face threats or not (Goldsmith 2004; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; and Acemoglu 2003) . According to this argument, leaders facing challenges to their rule will be unlikely to promote measured actions to obtain long-range returns since they, uncertain of reaping the long-term benefits of developmental rule, will instead focus all their resources on staying in power. In line with the same logic, leaders' not facing any threats will, on the other hand, have greater incentives to promote developmental policies and good government since they are more certain about being able to reap the fruits of such reforms in the future (Englebert 2000) . While this paper does not question -and to a certain extent even confirms -the micro mechanisms underlying this argument, it still holds that a historical institutionalist perspective, emphasizing the conditions leaders face during formative moments of state development, can even further improve our understanding of variation in institutional quality. Historical institutionalism emphasizes the lingering effects of policy choices made during so-called critical junctures. As such, it recognizes critical junctures as "windows of opportunity" for institutional change in the sense that, what takes place during such periods, will affect subsequent development for a long period of time. Based on this logic, the argument developed and tested in this paper emphasizes the ways in which threats towards leaders during formative periods of state development have created a path dependency that is reflected in institutional quality even today.
In line with the main argument put forward in this paper, the empirical analysis -focusing on sub-Saharan Africa -in fact reveals a significant negative causal relationship between threats during the formative period comprising the first generation of independent rule and institutional quality today. More specifically, the empirical study shows that sub-Saharan African countries that experienced coups or conflicts during the first fifteen years after independence have significantly more corrupt institutions today than the countries not experiencing any such threats. In other words, quite in line with what other researchers have found, our study finds that leaders that are challenged discount the future and are, consequently, more likely to resort to kleptocratic types of rule.
However, quite contrary to what previous studies have argued, contemporary threats seem to play a significantly less important role than challenges towards leaders during formative periods of state development.
In sum, our paper reveals the importance of exploring historical events for understanding variation in development outcomes today. This analysis would of course be even more useful if it could shed some light also on the future, in particular with regard to the possibilities and prospects for change. Are states that experienced threats towards their leadership during formative periods of state development necessarily stuck in a bad equilibrium -the lack of institutional quality, and the lack of economic and political development reinforcing each other -or can negative development paths be broken? Unfortunately, as the stickiness of many corrupt systems gives us a hint about, development paths do not seem to be easily reversed. This should not at least be evident to the international donor community which, after fifteen years of incremental and piecemeal anticorruption efforts and many dollars later, can report few -if any -general success stories (Doig and Riley 1998; and Persson, Rothstein, and Teorell 2010) . Nonetheless, depending on the degree of optimism, the findings still provide at least some analytic leverage for thinking more positively about future change for the more corrupt countries. For example, some scholars would argue that the impact of events taking place during early critical junctures can be expected to diminish over time, increasing the opportunities for change (Lieberman 2003) . Other -perhaps less optimistic -scholars would argue that, even if the insights offered by this paper may not help promote a brighter future for the millions of people suffering under bad governance in the short run, at least we have now improved our understanding of why countries differ in terms of institutional quality, and under what circumstances development paths can in fact change. In order to increase the possibility that highquality institutions are established in the future, one important thing would indeed be to decrease the likelihood of threats towards leaders during up-coming critical junctures. However, the question of how this goal can most effectively be achieved -as well as the question of when the next critical juncture will take place -are both questions beyond the scope of this paper.
